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Abstract 
 
The problem of two companies of agents with one-step memory playing game is investigated in the 
context of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma under the partial imitation rule, where a player can imitate 
only those moves that he has observed in his games with his opponent. We limit our study to the 
special case where the players in the two groups enjoy the same conditions on a fully connected 
network, so that there are only two payoff matrices required: one for players playing games with 
members of the same company, and the other one for players playing games with members from a 
different company. We show that this symmetric case of two companies of players can be reduced to 
the one-company case with an effective payoff matrix, from which a phase diagram for the players 
using the two dominant strategies, Pavlov and Grim Trigger can be constructed. The phase diagram is 
computed by numerical integration of the approximate mean value equations. The results are in good 
agreement with simulations of the two-company model. The phase diagram leads to an interesting 
conclusion that a player will more likely become a Grim Trigger, regardless of their affiliated company, 
when the noise level increases so that he is more irrational, or when the intra-group temptation to 
defect increases. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Evolutionary game dynamics has been a topic studied intensively in the past few decades [1]-[7], with 
many applications in biology, ecology and economics [5][8]-[10]. Among numerous models for the 
game, the most studied one is the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) [4]-[7], in which players have a 
chance to play games repeatedly. Players may reward or punish their opponents based on their actions 
in previous rounds. Given a chance to revise a player's strategy, imitation has been an important means 
of both strategy learning for individual players and strategist evolution for the whole population 
[11][12]. For players with one step memory in the IPD game, several important strategies, such as 
Tit-for-Tat (TFT), Pavlov and Grim Trigger (GT), have been studied extensively and they dominate 
over other strategies in many scenarios [2][4][12]. However, recent studies have revealed that the 
traditional imitation process involves unrealistic assumptions on the players’ ability to imitate their 
opponents' moves that are not even been observed. This observation initiates the introduction of the 
partial imitation process, which is to take into consideration the incomplete information of the players. 
During the imitation process, a player can only imitate those moves that he has observed, not the whole 
meta-strategy of his opponent. Such an imitation process is called partial imitation [13]-[15]. 
Simulation based on this partial imitation rule (pIR) has shown very different fraction of strategists in 
the steady state, as compared to the traditional imitation rule (tIR), where the entire set of moves of the 
opponent will be copied. The differences between tIR and pIR have been extensively investigated using 
numerical simulation as well as approximate mean value equations [15], which agree well with 
numerical simulation.  
In this paper, we extend the analysis of the single population of players with one-step memory, 
imitating according to the partial imitation rule, to two competing populations of players. In the context 
of econophysics, these two populations of players correspond to agents belonging to two different 
companies. If we label the two populations of players by their companies, A and B, in general, we 
anticipate that there are three payoff matrices required to describe their evolution. The first one is a 
matrix MAA that determines the payoff between players in company A. The second matrix MBB 
determines the payoff between players in company B. A third matrix MAB=MBA determines the payoff 
between two players coming from different companies. In this paper, we make the simplifying 
assumption that MAA=MBB=Mintra, and MAB=MBA=Minter, where the subscripts intra and inter stand for 
“same company” and “different company”, respectively. We call this special case the symmetric case of 
the two-company model, which characterizes the situation where people sharing a common identity or 
culture treat strangers differently from their partners. From an earlier paper that addresses this scenario 
using the Ising model [16], we have found that there exists a way to reduce the analysis of the 
two-company model using a one-company model with an effective interaction parameter. We find that 
this paradigm does carry over from the Ising model to the 2x2 game of two companies of players.  
Based on the partial imitation process, this paper addresses the possible phase transition between 
the Grim Trigger dominant regime and the Pavlov dominant regime. Using the approximate mean value 
equations for the imitation process of a single company of players with an effective payoff matrix, we 
find good agreement between numerical simulations of the original two-company model with the 
integration of the mean value equations for the one-company model. The analysis reveals the existence 
of a phase transition between the two dominant types of players, Grim Trigger and Pavlov, with a 
three-dimensional phase diagram parameterized by the noise factor in the imitation process, the “inter-” 
and the “intra-” company payoff matrix.  
 
 
 
II. Model  
 
IIA. Payoff Matrix 
In a Prisoner's Dilemma game between two players, each person chooses either to cooperate (C) or to 
defect (D). Based on these two choices the two players receive their payoff. A cooperating player 
scores R (S) if his opponent cooperates (defects) and a defecting player scores T (P) if his opponent 
cooperates (defects). Here R stands for the Reward for cooperation, S the Sucker's payoff, T the 
Temptation to defect and P the Punishment for mutual defection. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
imposes the following restrictions on the payoff parameters: T > R > P > S , and to prevent collusion 
2R should be greater than T + P. The game between players from two companies A and B in general 
have three possible different payoff matrices: two for intra-company interaction, MAA and MBB and one 
for inter-company interaction, MAB=MBA.  All three payoff matrices will adopt the following form  
 
1 0
0
R S
T P b
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞=⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠  (1) 
where b (>1) is the temptation to defect and is the only tunable variable, and we assume the case of 
weak Prisoner's dilemma game [5][17]. For clarity, ,intra Ab and ,intra Bb will be used to denote the 
temptations in the intra-company payoff matrices of population A and B, and interb will be used to 
denote temptation in the inter-company payoff matrix. Generally, the three parameters, ,intra Ab , 
,intra Bb  and interb are different for the three payoff matrices. As we limit our study to the special case 
where the players in the two companies have the same payoff matrix, we have , ,intra A intra B intrab b b= = . 
Besides, interb is required to be no less than intrab  in order to characterize the aforementioned 
hostility-against-stranger behavior.  
 
IIB. One step memory 
For IPD with one step memory, each strategy can be specified by the response (C or D) a player will 
take according to the last round played. Furthermore, the game requires the specification of the initial 
move of the players. In each round of game between two players, there are four possible outcomes 
((“my move”  “opponent’s move”)=DD, DC, CD, CC) with the immediate payoffs P, T, S and R, 
respectively. In the context of one step memory, a player can recall his opponent's and his own strategy 
in the past one round. They can have responses in terms of strategy ࣭௉, ்࣭, ௌ࣭ and ࣭ோ for the DD, 
DC, CD and CC in the previous step respectively. Together with the initial move ࣭଴, we can encode 
the strategy of IPD with one step memory by the following notation: ࣭଴|࣭௉்࣭ ௌ࣭࣭ோ. For example, GT 
is ܥ|ܦܦܦܥ and Pavlov is ܥ|ܥܦܦܥ. Since a strategy is denoted by ࣭଴|࣭௉்࣭ ௌ࣭࣭ோ  which have five 
bits and each slot encoded by either C or D, therefore, there are a total of 32 possible strategies in the 
strategy space sM of IPD with one step memory.  
 
 
IIC. partial Imitation Rule (pIR) and recurrent state 
The essential idea of pIR is that a player can only imitate the exposed part of his opponent's 
meta-strategy. For example, let’s consider Alice using strategy ܦ|ܦܦܦܦ ൌ ࣭଴஺|࣭௉ ஺்࣭ ஺ ௌ࣭ ஺࣭ோ ஺ to 
play against Bob who uses ܥ|ܦܥܦܥ ൌ ࣭଴஻|࣭௉஻்࣭஻ ௌ࣭஻࣭ோ஻. Alice and Bob will play according to their 
and their opponents' action in the previous step. Initially, Alice will play D, and Bob will play C. Thus, 
for the next step, Alice will see that the pattern for (“my move” “opponent’s move”) in the previous 
round is (DC), thus her response for the present step should be ்࣭ ஺ ൌD. For Bob, he will see that the 
pattern for (“my move” “opponent’s move”) in the previous round is (CD), therefore, his response for 
the present step should be ௌ࣭஻ ൌ ܦ.  Now, in the next step, both Alice and Bob will see the strategy 
pattern in the previous step to be (DD). Thus, they will be both using D in response and that will persist 
forever. To summarize, Alice observes the following transition: after the initial outcome ܦܥ ൌ ࣭଴஺࣭଴஻, 
the second outcome is ܦܦ ൌ ࣭୘୅࣭ୗ୆, and then all subsequent outcomes will be ܦܦ ൌ ࣭௉ ஺࣭௉஻ . 
Therefore, Alice has only witnessed Bob using three moves, ࣭଴஻, ௌ࣭஻, and ࣭௉஻, which are all the 
moves she will adopt if she is to imitate Bob. Consequently, Alice's strategy will transform from 
࣭଴஺|࣭௉ ஺்࣭ ஺ ௌ࣭ ஺࣭ோ ஺ ൌD|DDDD to ࣭଴஻|࣭௉୆்࣭ ஺ ௌ࣭୆࣭ோ ஺ ൌ  ܥ|ܦܦܦܦ if Alice imitates Bob, but this 
strategy is not exactly Bob’s strategy. In fact, Alice will not learn Bob’s cooperative moves, which are 
்࣭஻ ൌ ܥ, and ࣭ோ஻ ൌ ܥ, since Bob has never used these moves in his encounter with Alice. Therefore, 
Alice retains her own meta-strategy ்࣭ ஺ ൌ ܦ  and ࣭ோ ஺ ൌ ܦ  This example shows the difference 
between the idea behind our partial imitation rule and the traditional imitation rule where Alice's 
strategy will change from D|DDDD to ܥ|ܦܥܦܥ.  
In the limit of weak selection [8][18], players play a larger number of games before imitation 
happens. Eventually, players get into the so-called recurrent state [12][15] in which a set of strategy 
pattern for (“my move” “opponent’s move”) are revisited over and over again. In the above example, 
the recurrent state for Alice and Bob is (DD). We assume that in an encounter, the game plays long 
enough so that the initial transient state is negligible. Under this assumption, the average payoff ijU in 
the encounter between players i and j is the total recurrent state payoff divided by the number of rounds 
in the recurrent state. For instance, the payoff for Alice and Bob in the above example is the payoff of 
the recurrent state (DD). If we use the payoff matrix in Eq.(1), both Alice and Bob get payoff zero in 
the recurrent state.  
After obtaining the recurrent state payoff ijU  in the encounter between players i and j, we now 
compute the total average payoff of a given player. We note that this chosen player will play games 
with all other players and his total average payoff iU  is  
 ( )
1
sN
intra inter
i j,intra ij j,inter ij
j
U U Uρ ρ
=
= +∑  (2) 
where intraijU is the average payoff that a player with strategy i obtains when he confronts another 
player with strategy j from the same company, while interijU is the average payoff when the other player 
comes from a different company, j,intraρ is the density of players with the j-th strategy in the same 
company as player i, j,interρ is the density of players with the j-th strategy in a different company from 
player i's company, and 32sN =  is the number of strategies in the one-step memory strategy space. 
Here j runs from 1 to sN so that all strategies are included. Based on the average total payoff, we can 
proceed to implement the partial imitation of strategies. In general, a player affiliated with a particular 
company can also switch to the other company, but here we forbid such change for simplicity. We find 
that in the symmetric two-company model, this extra restriction on the players in their switching of 
affiliation hardly makes any difference in the final analysis.  
 
IID. Macroscopic Dynamics 
Realistic players are not totally rational [19]-[21]. The players’ irrationality can be characterized by a 
probability of imitation that depends on the difference of the average payoff calculated in Eq.(2) 
between the imitator i and the role model j. Mathematically, if we denote j iU U U∆ = − to be the 
payoff difference between player i and j, then the probability of i imitating j is given by  
 
 ( ) ( ) 1 1 imitates 
1 exp 1 exp i j
P i j g U
U U U
K K
= ∆ = =∆ −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞+ − +⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 (3) 
 
where K is a temperature-like parameter called noise factor that controls the degree of irrationality 
[19]-[21]. Note that the payoff for player i and j depends on the density of the strategythat player i and j 
use.  However, the evolution of density of the strategies also depends on the imitation probability in 
the evolution of the populations. One approach to solve this problem is to use the self-consistent 
approximate mean value equations, which describe the macroscopic dynamics of the population 
evolution [11][19]-[21]. Based on the traditional imitation rule, the approximate mean value equations 
are:  
 
( ) ( )
1,...,32
tIR
i
i j i j j i
j
d g U U g U U
dt
i
ρ ρ ρ ⎡ ⎤= − − −⎣ ⎦
=
∑  (4) 
We recently extend the approximate mean value equations to the case under partial imitation rule 
[13-15]:  
 ( ) ( ) ( ), ,
          1, ..., 32
pIR
i
j k j k i j j i
j k j
d
g U U p k j i g U U
dt
i
ρ ρ ρ ρ ρ= − − −
=
∑ ∑ ∑  (5) 
where [ ]: 0,1s s sp M M M× × →  is the probability ( ), ,p k j i that k-strategist will become an 
i-strategist by imitating a j-strategist and Ms is the strategy space of one-step memory.  In the case of 
pIR,  
 ( )
1    if -strategist imitating
     -strategist becomes 
, ,
      -strategist
0    otherwise
k
j
p k j i
i
⎧⎪⎪= ⎨⎪⎪⎩
 (6) 
Given the initial distribution of the strategist density ( )0; 1,...,32i t iρ = = , the integration of the 
self-consistent approximate mean value equations describes the evolution of the strategists. In this 
paper, we focus on the behavior of the population at steady state. Since GT and Pavlov [13] are the 
most interesting and dominating strategies in a large range of temptation values b and noise factor K, 
we will only discuss the phase transition associated with these two strategies in this paper.  
 
IIE. Numerical simulation 
The number of players in the simulation is 500,000. Initially, these players are divided equally to each 
of the two companies. In each company, all the 32 strategies are present in the same fraction. In the 
evolution, we define one Monte Carlo (MC) step to have 500,000 imitation processes. As we have 
assumed fully connectedness among all the players, in each encounter two players are selected 
randomly either from the same company or from different companies during the imitation process. The 
imitation probability is determined by Eq.(3). People cannot change from the present company to the 
other company. The simulation lasts until all of the strategies in both companies reach steady state.  
 
 
III. REDUCTION TO ONE-COMPANY CASE 
 
The symmetry introduced in the two-company model refers to the assumption that bintra1 = bintra2 . We 
show in this section that this provides a simplification that reduces the two-company case to a 
one-company problem. First, we expect that this symmetry suggests that company imitation is not 
important since the proportion of players in each company will deviate only a little bit from one half.  
Let’s assume that every strategy in each company will have almost the same fraction, that is 
iA iBρ ρ≈ for a certain strategy i, where iAρ , iBρ means the fraction of the strategy i in company A 
and B respectively, and the symbol ≈  indicates that the symmetry is only approximate in the 
stochastic process of imitation. This assumption will be tested by simulation in Section IV. 
Nevertheless, if the deviation from the perfect symmetry can be neglected, we assume that the 
company affiliation does not affect the total average payoff of a certain strategy. Therefore, under 
perfect symmetry, / 2i iA iBρ ρ ρ= = we can write Eq.(2) as 
 ( )2j intra interi ij ijjU U U
ρ= +∑  (7) 
It can be easily verified that if ( ) 1
0
C Cooperate ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
uv
 and ( ) 0
1
D Defect ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
uv
, then the payoff of 
player i with meta-strategy { },iS C D∈ uv uv confronting play j with meta-strategy { },jS C D∈ uv uv will be 
T
i jS MS  where T is the transposition on vector, and M is the intra or inter-company payoff matrix in 
Eq.(1). Borrowing Dirac’s notation in quantum mechanics, the payoff can be written in a compact way 
as | |i jS M S . The average payoff of player i confronting player j will be  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1lim | | | |
Time
ij i j i jTime t
U S t M S t S t M S t
Time→∞ =
= =∑  (8) 
 
where t is the MC step in the imitation process and ( ) ( ) { }, ,i jS t S t C D∈ uv uv depend on the given 
strategies i and j. Using Mintra to denote the intra-company payoff matrix and Minter for inter-company 
payoff matrix, we can combine Eq.(7) and (8) to write  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )| | | |2ji i inter j i intra jjU S t M S t S t M S tρ⎡ ⎤= +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑  
 (9) 
Since ( )iS t  and ( )jS t  are independent of the payoff matrix, Eq.(9) can be simplified as  
 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
| |
2
| |
j
i i inter intra j
j
j i eff j
j
U S t M M S t
S t M S t
ρ
ρ
= +
=
∑
∑
 (10) 
where  
 ( ) / 2eff inter intraM M M= +  (11) 
is the effective payoff matrix, including the contribution from the intra-company and inter-company 
payoff matrix, which can be explicitly written in matrix form as: 
 ( )
1 0 1 0
0 / 2 0eff intra interb b b
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞=⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 (12) 
We see that Eq. (12) corresponds exactly to the payoff matrix for a one-company model with 
temptation effb .  Now, according to our assumption that symmetry is preserved on the average in the 
two-company model, the only difference between the dynamics of a two-company model with the one 
company model is the way the average payoff is calculated. The calculation involves two different 
payoff matrices in the former case while in the latter case only involves one. Therefore, we can use the 
one-company model with effective payoff matrix in Eq. (12) to approximate the symmetric 
two-company model with reduced computational effort. We will evaluate this approximation using 
simulation in the next section.  Note that this reduction can be generalized to multi-company case as 
long as the symmetry approximation remains valid. Such reduction to one-company model allows us to 
use the approximate mean value equation Eq.(5)(6) for the analysis of the multi-company model, which 
saves computational effort greatly.   
 
 
 
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND PHASE DIAGRAM 
 
First, let’s examine the low noise regime, with K=0.01, so that the imitation process is more rational 
and the results converge faster towards the steady state. We fix the value of bintra at 1.1 and vary binter 
and compare the direct simulation results for the two-company model and the simulation results 
derived from the effective one-company model. Since the approximate mean value equations have been 
verified to give good agreement to the simulation result for the one-company model [11][19]-[21], we 
can therefore directly compare the simulation results of the symmetric two-company model with the 
integration results from the mean value equations for the one-company case with payoff matrix in 
Eq.(12). This comparison is shown in Fig. 1. Since the model assumes symmetry on the two companies, 
we only show the total fraction of a particular strategy j, as discussed in section III. The circles and 
triangles are the simulated steady state strategy density for GT and Pavlov in the symmetric 
two-company model. The solid and dashed lines are the integrated steady state strategy density for GT 
and Pavlov using the mean value equations for the one-company model with effective payoff matrix in 
Eq.(12).  
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Fig. 1 Total fraction of strategy GT and Pavlov versus binter when bintra = 1.1 and the noise factor 
K = 0.01. The circles (triangles) are the strategy densities for GT (Pavlov) in the steady state from 
numerical simulation, while the solid (dashed) lines are the strategy densities for GT (Pavlov) in 
the steady state from integration using Eq.(5) with effective payoff matrix in Eq.(12).  
We see that the agreement is quite good. We also observe that when binter increases, Pavlov loses its 
dominance to Grim Trigger. Now, let’s discuss the critical value of 
interb  at the crossover point of 
these two strategies and denote it by c
interb .  This crossover point marks the outgrowth of these two 
opposite trends. When cinter interb b< , we have a Pavlov-dominant phase, and cinter interb b>  the 
GT-dominant phase.  
By varying K and bintra , we obtain a three-dimensional phase diagram, showing the critical value 
inter
cb  as a function of K and bintra subjected to the constraint 1 , 2intra interb b≤ ≤ . In order to avoid 
computational effort in simulation at various set of parameters, we obtain the phase diagram by 
integrating the approximate mean value equations (Eq.(5)(6)). We first show in the left axis of Fig. 2, 
the good agreement between the results from integration based on Eq.(5)(6) and the results from 
numerical simulation on the two-company model at a fixed K. The open squares represent cinterb  from 
the numerical simulation, and the solid line represent cinterb  from the relation 
'2cinter eff intrab b b= − , 
where '
effb is the critical value of effective temptation in the one-company model, obtained through the 
integration of the mean value equations. Note that ' ' ( )eff effb b K=  is a function of noise K, as 
described by Fig. 2(b). The right axis of Fig. 2(a) shows percentage error e between the numerical 
simulation of the two-company model and the integration result of the mean value equations: 
( ) ( )( )simulation integration / 100%c cinter inter intrae b b b= − × . The error is in general below 0.5%. The 
agreement between the critical value cinterb  for simulation and integration confirms numerically that 
the simplification of the two-company model to the one-company model in the case of identical 
intra-company payoff matrix, provides a good approximation, as discussed in Section III.  
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Fig. 2 (a) The left Y axis shows the comparison between the results based on numerical simulation on the 
two-company model (open squares), and the result obtained from the integration of the approximate mean 
value equations (solid lines). The right Y axis shows in triangles the percentage error e of 
inter
cb  between 
the numerical simulation of the two-company model and the integration result of the mean value equations. 
(b) Relation between '
effb and noise K obtained through the integration of the approximate mean value 
equations. 
 
Based on the excellent agreement between the simulation results on two-company model and the 
integrated results from the approximate mean value equations for the one-company model with 
effective payoff matrix, we obtain the full phase diagram shown in Fig.3.  
 
Fig. 3 Phase diagram showing the surface that separates the GT dominant phase 
(above the surface) from the Pavlov dominant phase.  
We notice in Fig. 2 that the linear relation between bintra and binter  at a fixed K in the phase diagram 
is exactly the one shown in Eq.(11), since the reduction from two-company to one-company is valid. 
The line defined by   
 '
inter intra intra( , ) 2
c
effb K b b b= −  (13) 
can be interpreted as the phase boundary in the following discussion.   
  
From the phase diagram in Fig. 3, we see how the domination of GT and Pavlov changes with the 
parameter intrab and the noise factor K. At a fixed intrab  and K, the GT-dominant region lies in the 
region of higher cinter interb b> . Since we have already shown that the reduction to one-company 
model is good, we can get more insight using the one-company model, which we have a better 
understanding. In general, a high b value in a one-company model corresponds to a more exploiting 
game, i.e., locally it favors defection rather than cooperation, as the temptation to defect is high. 
Meanwhile, GT can be considered as a more defensive strategy than Pavlov (GT player only 
cooperates when both of the players cooperates in the previous round of game while Pavlov player 
cooperates when both of them defects or cooperates in the previous round of game), although both 
strategies are considered cooperative (They both do not seek to defect at the first place; when they and 
their opponents both play C in the last move they will seek to continue to play C in the current move). 
In the context of the two-company model, when there is sufficient animosity between two companies, 
i.e., in the high interb  region, all players will tend to defend their payoff by playing GT, as shown in 
Fig. 1. We see that the critical value for GT to be dominant is cinterb , which is decreasing with 
increasing intrab at a given fixed noise level K, which in turn also fixes ' ' ( )eff effb b K= .  Thus, in 
the presence of fierce competition or animosity for players of the same company (large intrab ), the 
critical cinterb will be reduced, making the player more inclined to become a Grim Trigger player.  In 
another word, for a given 
interb  that is initially below the original critical value ( ),cinter intrab K b , an 
increased value of intrab  that leads to a new smaller value c,NEWinterb  can result in having  interb  
larger than c,NEW
inter
b .  Thus, increasing intrab sufficiently can lead to the dominance of Grim Trigger 
over Pavlov. This leads to the following interesting interpretation. The more inimical players are 
towards others in the same company, the less animosity from another group they can tolerate. In this 
case, the player becomes even more hostile and is more likely to defect when he encounters a player of 
the opposing company, when hostility with players of his own company increases.  
We can also analyze the critical ( )cinter intrab K,b  as a function of the noise K. From Fig.2b, the larger 
the noise, the smaller the '
effb . This means that for fixed intrab , the increased noise level will reduce the 
critical ( )cinter intrab K,b .  Again, for a given  interb  , which may originally be less than a given
( )cinter intrab K,b  and Pavlov is dominant, an increased noise reduces cinterb  to c,NEWinterb  so that 
interb  can become larger than c,NEWinterb and the dominant strategies can be changed from Pavlov to GT. 
Thus, noise or irrationality, tends to agitate players to become more hostile and defensive to others 
indiscriminately, e.g. people in a circle with not quite rational  friends (their friends changes their 
normal behavior occasionally) tends to be more defensive. The result again is that they tend to become 
GT and are more likely to defect.  
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we modify the traditional Prisoner’s Dilemma game to become more reasonable 
modification in two ways. Firstly, we adopt the partial imitation rule between players with one-step 
memory, so that a player only imitates those moves observed during games with his opponents, not 
those that have not been observed. This realistic modification has been discussed in several recent 
papers [13-15]. The second modification of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game comes from the natural 
clustering of players to form groups, so that they incline to be more cooperative (less hostile) to their 
colleagues than to a player of the opposite camp. This is a natural extension of a homogeneous group of 
players, and can be interpreted in the context of econophysics for agents belonging to two competing 
companies. This introduction of companies or groups takes into account some inherent difference 
among players during the payoff calculation. With these two modifications, we address the simple case 
of only two groups of players who have different level of temptation to defect, depending on affiliation 
of his opponent. We find that when the two groups of players have similar defensive level among their 
colleagues, in the sense that they have the same intra-group temptation to defect, the two-company 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game can be mapped onto a one-company model with an effective payoff matrix, 
characterized by an effective temptation to defect. The mapping is approximate, but numerical 
simulation of the game shows that this approximation is good. Furthermore, using the mean value 
equations for the evolution of the strategy density, we find that there is a crossover of dominant 
strategies between the Grim Trigger and Pavlov. The mean value equations also enable us to draw a 
phase diagram, with a surface in the three-dimensional parameter space of noise, inter-company and 
intra-company temptation. The interpretation of this phase boundary, defined by ( )cinter intrab K,b  in 
Eq.(12), reveals the interesting result that a player will become more hostile and defensive to others, 
regardless of their affiliated company when the noise level increases, i.e. when he is more irrational. 
This also happens when the intra-group temptation to defect increases. In summary, Grim Trigger will 
more readily dominate Pavlov with either increased noise or increased intra-company temptation to 
defect.  
Finally, it is important to remember that all the results in this paper are based on the assumptions 
that the players have one-step memory, learning from opponents using the partial imitation rule, and 
that the two companies of players have identical intra-company temptation to defect. Our future work 
will investigate the validity of our conclusions when any or all of these assumptions fails. For example, 
we can ask if the results remain valid when the players have longer memory. We anticipate that this 
extension is a computational nightmare, since the dimension of the space of strategies increases 
exponentially with the length of memory. Recent studies on Prisoner's Dilemma game with two-step 
memories have already shown to be very difficult [12]. Further extension to longer memory could be 
even more difficult, as the number of possible strategies amounts to 1021 in the three-step memory case 
[13]. On the other hand, it is more interesting, hopefully also easier, to investigate the question of 
symmetry breaking process on the intra-company temptation parameter, intrab .  New phenomena may 
emerge when ,intra Ab  for company A is sufficiently different from ,intra Bb  for company B.  The 
phase diagrams for these cases are certainly much more complex. 
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